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I. Introduction 
Appellants, Kenton Johnson, Nephi Allen, and Rexburg Plumbing and Heating LLC, seek 
the removal of a large sign placed within a right-of-way. The district court granted summary 
judgment to Respondent, Highway 101 Investments, LLC (hereinafter Highway 101). Johnson, 
Allen, and Rexburg Plumbing and Heating appealed to this Court. Johnson, Allen and Rexburg 
Plumbing and Heating filed Appellants' Brief on May 30, 2012, and Highway 101 filed 
Respondent's Brief August 2,2012. Johnson, Allen and Rexburg Plumbing and Heating now 
file Appellants' Reply Brief. 
II. Argument 
A. The deed creating the right-of-way is not ambiguous and must be construed 
consistent with its plain meaning - which is that the right-of-way is 25 feet in 
width. 
Johnson and Allen's deed is not ambiguous and clearly identifies both the privilege 
granted by the easement and the property subject to the easement. The relevant portion of the 
deed reads as follows: 
ALSO A right-of-way to be used in common with others described as 
follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest comer of Section 17, Township 6 North, 
Range 40 East, Boise Meridian, Madison County, Idaho; thence East 
140.90 feet; thence North 565.74 feet to the true point of beginning; and 
running thence North 89°49'50" East 378.37 feet; thence South 25.00 feet; 
thence South 89°49'50" West 394.40 feet; thence North 32°37'44" East 
29.74 feet to the point of beginning. 
The district court correctly found that the deed was not ambiguous. R. Vol. 3, p. 423. Highway 
101 has not previously asserted that the deed is ambiguous. Id. 
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When this Court interprets or construes a deed, its primary goal is to seek and give effect 
to the real intention of the parties. Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 404,195 P.3d 1212,1217 
(2008) (internal citations omitted). If the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous, the 
intention of the parties must be ascertained from the deed itself and extrinsic evidence is not 
admissible. Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006) (internal 
citations omitted). A deed may be ambiguous if the language of the deed is subject to conflicting 
interpretations. Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497, 499, 112 P.3d 785, 787 (2005) (internal citations 
omitted). 
Johnson and Allen's deed is not subject to conflicting interpretations. The deed reads "A 
right-of-way to be used in common with others described as follows", and then provides a legal 
description. It is not possible to read the legal description as being anything other than a legal 
description of the right-of-way. 
Although the deed is not ambiguous and extrinsic evidence is not necessary for its 
application, if the Court were to consider extrinsic evidence, it is clear that the intent ofthe 
parties was to create a 25 foot wide strip of property for use as a driveway or street subject to 
easements held by all three of the neighboring property owners. The right-of-way is described in 
the deeds of all three property owners adjacent to the right-of-way and has been since at least 
1986. R. Vol. 1, pp. 151, 152, 155, 157, 160, 161, 164, 165, 168. Each deed includes the words 
"to be used in common with others" specifically recognizing that the right-of-way is shared with 
others. Id. The right-of-way appears as a right-of-way or street on various surveys and maps in 
the record - often with the width or location of the right-of-way included. R. Vol. 1, pp. 125, 
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128, 131, 132, 134, 135, 137, 140, 148. The right-of-way provides each of the three businesses 
access to Idaho Highway 33. App. Br., App. A. There is nothing in the record that indicates that 
the right-of-way was intended to be of indefinite width or that the legal description in the deed 
describes anything other than the location of the right-of-way. 
Highway 101 argues that the words "over the property described as follows" should be 
read into the deed. Resp't Br. p. 15. It does so without citation to any authority that would allow 
this Court to modifY the plain language of the deed. The Court should decline Highway 101 's 
invitation to modifY the unambiguous conveyance of the right-of-way. 
Highway 101 appears to argue that because the legal description of the easement is 
identical to the legal description in a deed to Highway 101 granting them fee simple title to the 
area subject to the easement, the easement cannot encompass the entire parcel. Resp's Bf. pp. 
13-14. However, Highway 101 points to nothing in the record or case law that indicates that an 
easement cannot be identical in location to a parcel or that a property owner cannot convey the 
property subject to an easement. In this case, Highway 101 did not obtain title to the property 
subject to the right-of-way until nearly a year after it installed the sign. R. Vol. 2, p. 286. 
Highway 101 has asserted that it installed the sign based on a mistaken belief that it owned the 
property subject to the right-of-way. Id. It subsequently obtained title to the property subject to 
the right-of-way and received a deed whose legal description is identical to the description of the 
right-of-way. R. Vol. 1, p. 145; Vol. 2, p. 286. Nothing about this has any effect on the meaning 
of Johnson and Allen's deed. Highway 101 's argument that the legal description of the easement 
cannot be identical to a legal description of a parcel of property is not supported by case law or 
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the record. 
Highway 101 argues that the deed is not specific in that it does not include language such 
as "a 25 foot wide easement." Resp's Br. p. 14-16. However, the deed does better than merely 
indicate the width, the deed provides the precise legal description of the right-of-way - which 
includes the precise length and width of the easement. 
As the conveyance is not subject to conflicting interpretations, the Court must hold that 
the legal description in the conveyance is the legal description of the right-of-way. 
B. Johnson and Allen's right to use the right-of-way, and their right to have the 
sign removed, does not equate to ownership of the property. 
Highway 101 argues that if it is not allowed to place a permanent obstruction within the 
right-of-way, it will be as if Johnson and Allen have fee simple title to the property. Resp's Br. 
p. 14. This is not the case. As the owner of the servient property, Highway 101 is entitled to 
make use of the property in ways that do not interfere with the rights of the dominant easement 
holders. For example, Highway 101 is entitled to sell the property - Johnson and Allen have no 
such right. Highway 101 is entitled to mine or otherwise use the area under the right-of-way -
Johnson and Allen have no such rights. The only rights Johnson and Allen have regrading the 
property are the easement rights granted by their deed. All other rights belong to Highway 101 at 
the owner of the property. 
Clearly, Highway WI's ability to use the property is restricted due to the existence of the 
right-of-way. This is the nature of easements. Express easements are recorded to provide notice 
that they exist and that there may be restrictions on the use of the servient property. This 
particular right-of-way serves three busy businesses, including Highway 101 's self-storage 
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business. It may be that there are few uses, other than a roadway, that would be consistent with 
the easements in place. However, when Highway 101 took title to the property in question, it did 
so subject to all easements of record. R. Vol. 1, p. 145. Highway 101 cannot now be heard to 
complain that the easements on the property are overly restrictive. All ofthe easements were 
properly recorded and Highway 101 had both constructive and actual notice of the easements 
before it installed the sign and before it obtained the property subject to the easement. R. Vol. I, 
pp.174-177. 
C. Idaho Law does not support Highway 101 IS assertion that an expressly 
granted right-of-way can be diminished based on a reasonableness analysis. 
Highway 101 cites to various Idaho decisions in support its argument. However, none of 
those cases supports Highway 101 IS position. 
Highway 101 cites the following language from Drew v. Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534, 540, 
989 P.2d 276, 282 (1999): 
As long as Sorensen is able to use the easement for access to his land for 
the specific purpose for which the easement was granted, without 
unreasonable interference, he has received everything to which he is 
legally entitled. 
Highway 101 uses this language to suggest that as long as Allen and Johnson are able to access 
their property, they have received everything to which they are entitled. Resp.' s Br. pp. 6-7. In 
Drew, the dominant easement holder had fenced off the area subject to his easement claiming 
that his actions were the rightful exercise of a "secondary easement." Id 133 Idaho at 538, 989 
P.2d at 280. The Court ruled that although he was entitled to use the property subject to the 
easement, he was not entitled to fence it or prevent the servient property owner from accessing it. 
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Id 133 Idaho at 537-540, 989 P.2d at 279-282. Drew did not address what actions on the part of 
the servient property owner would constitute unreasonable interference - rather, it addressed over 
reaching by the dominant easement holder. As such, Drew is not on point. Even if it were, the 
language cited by Highway 101 does not support its position because Allen and Johnson are not 
able to use a significant portion of the right-of-way. Nothing in Drew supports Highway 10 l's 
position that it can place a permanent obstruction within a right-of-way. 
Highway 101 relies heavily on Boydstun Beach Ass'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 
914 (Ct. App. 1986). Boydstun Beach was addressed in some detail in Appellants' Brief. App. 
Br. pp. 7-11. Highway 101 appears to concede that Boydstun Beach does not allow for a 
reasonableness analysis for privileges granted in a creating document and that it would only 
support Highway 10 l's position if the area subject to the right-of-way is not specifically 
identified. Resp's Br. p. 10. However, as previously discussed, the right-of-way is precisely 
defined by the deed. As such, Boydstun Beach provides no support for Highway WI's position. 
Highway 101 next looks to Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 728 P.2d 778 (Ct. App. 
1986) for support. As a decision of the Court of Appeals, Carson is not binding on this Court, 
but was binding on the district court. However, to the degree that Carson provides any guidance, 
it is supportive of Johnson and Allen's position. Carson is distinguished from this case, and 
from Boydstun, by the fact that the precise dimensions of the right-of-way in question appear to 
be unknown. The Court of Appeals simply states that "Carson enjoys an easement to use the 
driveway" and provides no additional information regarding the terms of the easement. Id 111 
Idaho at 890, 728 P.2d at 779. As such, the Court of Appeals looked to the purpose of the 
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easement in determining its location. The Court of Appeals referenced an ALR article regarding 
the width of easements whose dimensions are not set out in the creating document and 
determined that the location of the easement included sufficient space to allow the easement 
holder to turn vehicles around. Id To the degree that Carson has any application to this case it 
is to show that an obstacle that is "occasionally" in the way or hit "sometimes" is an 
unreasonable interference with a right-of-way, despite evidence that such occurrences were rare. 
Id 111 Idaho at 891, 728 P.2d at 780. As such, the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment in this case when there was evidence indicating that the sign was hit by "many" of 
Rexburg Plumbing and Heating Customers as well as by Nephi Johnson himself. R. Vol 1, pp. 
183-184; Vol. 2, p. 305. 
Lastly, Highway 101 argues that its position is supported by Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. 
v. Washington Federal Sav. 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001). However, Nampa & Meridian 
did not address a right-of-way of the type at issue in this case. Rather, it was concerned with an 
easement for canal maintenance. This Court determined that the irrigation company's easement 
rights flowed equally from an express easement conveyed by a document titled "Channel Change 
Easement" (CCE) and from I.C. § 42-1102, which creates a statutory easement for the cleaning, 
maintenance, and repair of irrigation ditches. Id 135 Idaho at 522,518,20 P.3d at 706. Because 
the easement's only purpose was canal maintenance, the question addressed by the district court 
was whether the construction of a sidewalk and fence would interfere with the irrigation district's 
ability to maintain the canal. Id 135 Idaho at 522-523,518,20 P.3d at 706-707. The district 
court found that the CCE prevented the irrigation company from maintaining the canal from the 
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side where the sidewalk and fence were installed and that the sidewalk and fence would not 
interfere with the irrigation district's ability to maintain the canal. Id This Court upheld that 
decision as supported by competent, albeit conflicting, evidence. Id Nampa & Meridian does 
not support the proposition that the area of an expressed and specific right-of-way can be 
diminished based on a "reasonableness analysis." 
D. If Highway 101 is the prevailing party, it is not entitled to attorney's fees on 
appeal. 
In the event that Highway 101 is the prevailing party on appeal, it is not entitled to 
attorney's fees. Appellants have provided the Court argument from Idaho cases and numerous 
examples of well reasoned cases from other jurisdictions in support of its position. An award of 
attorney fees on appeal is warranted only if the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation and attorney fees will not be awarded where the losing party 
brought the appeal in good faith and where a genuine issue of law was presented. I. C. § 12-121; 
Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 75 P.3d 185,190-191,139 Idaho 131, 136-137 (2003). 
III. Conclusion 
The Court should reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to Highway 101, 
grant summary judgment to Johnson and Allen, and order the removal of the sign. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of August, 2012. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY 
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I hereby certifY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date 
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mail-
ing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a 
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to 
them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this 17th day of August, 2012. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. 
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Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
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